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urged by the commentators after Rovello had, in effect, "relegated
it to its common law demurrer equivalent. ' 2 The language utilized
by the Guggenheimer Court, coupled with the legislative back-
ground of this section, furnishes ample support for this position. 3
Yet, by purporting to follow Rovello4 while actually applying a more
flexible standard, the Court has introduced some uncertainty into
this important area of civil practice. It is suggested that in future
cases the Court of Appeals seek to clarify its position on the appli-
cation of CPLR 3211(c) by articulating clear standards governing
the use of extrinsic material in pre-answer proceedings.
William T. Miller
ARTICLE 54-ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5401: Fourth department refutes competence of foreign
decree to directly affect New York realty
Designed to promote national unity, 5 the full faith and credit
82 CPLR 3211, commentary at 9 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); see Rovello v. Orfino
Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 636, 357 N.E.2d 970, 973, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314, 317 (1976) (Wachtler,
J., dissenting); The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 632, 642 (1977).
13 Additional support for the flexible approach approved in Guggenheimer can be found
in Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 278 N.E.2d 642, 645, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 436
(1972), a pre-Rovello decision, which permitted the use of affidavits upon the hearing of a
motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency. But see Gerber v. New York City Hous. Auth., 42
N.Y.2d 162, 366 N.E.2d 268, 397 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1977). In Gerber, the Court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint because the extrinsic facts left "no other conclusion" than that the
plaintiff had no cause of action. Id. at 167, 366 N.E.2d at 271, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 611. This
language would appear to bring Gerber within the rigid Rovello exception permitting the use
of affidavits only where they conclusively negate the cause of action. But see id. (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
14 See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
61 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355
(1948); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); Porter v. Wilson, 419 F.2d
254, 259 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1020 (1970). One commentary-has indicated
that the full faith and credit doctrine is aimed at providing "the benefits of a unified nation
by altering the status of otherwise 'independent, sovereign states."' Reese & Johnson, The
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. Rav. 153, 161 (1949) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Reese & Johnson] (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
355 (1948)). Since the underlying policy is the promotion of national unity, the courts should
apply federal law in determining whether one state must afford full faith and credit to another
state's judgment. Reese & Johnson, supra, at 161-62.
Because of the requirement "that the judgment of a state court should have the same
credit, validity, and effect in every other court in the United States, which it had in the State
where it was pronounced," Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818) (Mar-
shall, C.J.), quoted in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236 (1908) (Holmes, J.), the full faith
and credit clause extends nationwide res judicata effect to a state court's judgment. Since a
final judgment in a state court usually would be conclusive on the parties and unimpeachable
in subsequent proceedings within that state, full faith and credit mandates that all other
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clause of the United States Constitutions requires state courts to
recognize judgments rendered by tribunals of sister states 7 in the
proper exercise of their jurisdiction." Since a state generally has no
states give that judgment the same conclusiveness. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 437-46 (1943); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (Brandeis,
J.); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). The sole corrective for the alleged error in
a foreign proceeding lies in direct appeal through that state's court system. E.g., Lynn v.
Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 201, 97 N.E.2d 748, 751, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951); Di Russo v.
Di Russo, 55 Misc. 2d 839, 845-48, 287 N.Y.S.2d 171, 178-81 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968);
see Guggenheim v. Wahl, 203 N.Y. 390, 396, 96 N.E. 726, 728 (1911). Conversely, where the
law of the initial forum does not preclude a subsequent proceeding for further relief, a sister
state need not treat the first award as an obstacle to further recovery in its courts. E.g.,
Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 626-30 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 443 (1943) (dictum).
* U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) (implementing statute).
* See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 (1854); Sloan
v. Sloan, 195 Misc. 111, 88 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1949); D. SIEGEL, NEw YORK
PRACIcE §§ 443(7), 471 (1978); 11 GA. L. REv. 683, 684 (1977).-See generally H. GooDRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 395-97 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964) [hereinafter cited as GooDR)cH]. A state
whose judgments have not been respected in a sister state must nevertheless afford full faith
and credit to the sister state's judgments. See, e.g., Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S.
66, 75-78 (1939). In fact, a state must give full effect to foreign adjudications notwithstanding
that the state's public policy or statute of limitations would have banned the original cause
of action from its courts. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 (1942); Hirson v.
United Stores Corp., 263 App. Div. 646, 34 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 289 N.Y.
564, 43 N.E.2d 712 (1942).
The full faith and credit clause mandates acceptance of foreign judgments for a sum of
money, since such judgments constitute a conclusive adjudication of indebtedness. Tiede-
mann v. Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819, 824,158 N.Y.S. 851, 855 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd mem.,
225 N.Y. 709, 122 N.E. 892, cert. dismissed, 251 U.S. 536 (1919). The doctrine has been
interpreted, however, as not requiring a state to enforce a foreign court's order until it has
been reduced to judgment in a local court. Thus, a sister state's judgment does not serve as
a proper predicate for execution. E.g., GOODRICH, supra, at 388; Reese, Full Faith and Credit
to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IowA L. REv. 183, 184 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Reese]; see
Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 169 N.Y. 506, 513, 62 N.E. 587, 589
(1902), affl'd, 191 U.S. 373 (1903) (Holmes, J.); In re Estate of Ullman, 56 Misc. 2d 495, 505,
289 N.Y.S.2d 833, 843 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1968). In addition, although it must recognize
the validity of a foreign adjudication, the forum state need not adopt the methods the foreign
court would have employed to enforce its decision. Thus, in the traditional view, a state need
not comply with a sister state's order granting equitable relief, see Blue v. Standard Coil
Prods. Co., 117 N.Y.S.2d 858, 862 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952), since compliance would be
akin to implementing the judgment itself. See 172 App. Div. at 824-25, 158 N.Y.S. at 855.
Moreover, application of full faith and credit to decrees in equity would be tantamount to
requiring a sovereign state to act as an involuntary agent for another. See id. See generally
G. STUMBERG, PRINCILES OF CoNFur OF LAws 120-27 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
STUMBERG]; 7A WK&M 6301.26; see also Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, Injunctions
Against Suit and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 740, 743 (1962). For a criticism of
this view, see Reese, supra; note 91 infra. See generally GOODRICH, supra, at 410-14; Schwartz,
Fall v. Eastin Revisited. Extraterritorial Effect of Foreign Land Decrees, 54 DICK. L. REv.
293 (1950).
" In order for full faith and credit to be invoked in the subsequent litigation, it must be
determined that the first forum possessed competent subject matter jurisdiction over the suit
1978]
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jurisdiction over a res located outside its borders, 9 a state court
judgment purporting to directly affect title to land situated in an-
other state is not entitled to full faith and credit.70 Some state courts
outside New York, however, have voluntarily given effect to the
equitable relief provisions of such judgments when a party to the
first suit brings the same cause of action in the situs state.71 This
approach was rejected in Kindler v. Kindler,7" wherein the Appel-
late Division, Fourth Department, denied recognition to that part
of an Oklahoma in personam divorce decree which purported to
grant the former wife full title to real property located in New York
and held by the parties as tenants by the entirety.7 3
In Kindler, the plaintiff wife had obtained personal jurisdiction
and proper personal jurisdiction over the parties. See D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 471
(1978).
11 GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 136-37; see, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 12 (1909); Ames
v. Coirre, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Queens County). Real property is
subject to the jurisdiction and laws of the state in which it is located. See Leflar, Community
Property and Conflict of Laws, 21 CALmF. L. REv. 221, 221, 224 (1933). Personalty, while once
deemed to be in the owner's possession at all times and hence subject to the laws of the state
where the owner happens to be, see Van Cortlandt v. De Graffenried, 147 App. Div. 825, 830-
31, 132 N.Y.S. 1107, 1111 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd mem., 204 N.Y. 667, 98 N.E. 1118 (1912), is
now governed by the same rules as realty, e.g., GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 104. Intangibles,
such as patents, have siti at the owner's domicile. Ebsary Gypsum Co. v. Ruby, 256 N.Y.
406, 409-10, 176 N.E. 820, 821 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.).
"' See GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 404. An equitable decree of a sister state has no
immediate extraterritorial effect. Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156, 166 (1854); Tiedemann v.
Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819, 824, 158 N.Y.S. 851, 854-55 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd mem., 225
N.Y. 709, 122 N.E. 892, cert. dismissed, 251 U.S. 536 (1919); see note 67 supra. See generally
Reese, supra note 67, at 198-201.
7, See, e.g., Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N.W. 127 (1919); Dunlap v. Byers, 110
Mich. 109, 67 N.W. 1067 (1896); Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959);
Lea v. Dudley, 20 N.C. App. 702, 202 S.E.2d 799 (1974); Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St.
474 (1873); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICT OF LAWS § 102, Comments b & e (1971);
Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Ci. L. REv. 620, 672-76 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Currie]; Reese, supra note 67, at 190-91, 198-201. An equitable decree
may be determinative of the merits of the underlying claim and therefore have a partial
estoppel effect upon subsequent litigation in a sister state's courts. See Dobson v. Pearce, 12
N.Y. 156 (1854) ("recognizing" Connecticut injunction against suit because foreign findings
of fraud were conclusive under full faith and credit); Watters v. Watters, 259 App. Div. 611,
19 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1st Dep't 1940) (facts are settled even if erroneously ascertained). See
generally GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 414; 5 WK&M 5011.13; notes 87 & 91 infra. An
alternative rationale for enforcing a foreign court's order affecting domestic land is that the
foreign forum's order is operative directly against the party whose interest in the land is
sought to be conveyed and whose person was subject to the rendering court's jurisdiction. See
Weesrier v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); cf. Schwartz, Fall v. Eastin
Revisited: Extraterritorial Effect of Foreign Land Decrees, 54 DICK. L. REv. 293, 294 (1950)
(decree should be accorded full faith and credit where law of situs and forum are
"substantially the same").
n 60 App. Div. 2d 753, 400 N.Y.S.2d 605 (4th Dep't 1977) (mei.).
73 Id. at 754, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 605-06.
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over the defendant husband in a divorce action in Oklahoma.7 4 In
conjunction with the granting of the divorce, the Oklahoma court
awarded the wife full title to the parties' New York property. 5 Hav-
ing subsequently obtained jurisdiction over her former spouse, the
plaintiff brought an action in New York to enforce the property
provisions of the Oklahoma decree. 7 In response to the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that the Okla-
homa decree could not vest title in his former wife and asserted that
the only relief available was partition of the property.77 The trial
court denied the plaintiff's motion and instructed the parties to
proceed to partition.7
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, af-
firmed, noting that the courts of one state have no power to directly
affect land located in another state. 9 Citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Fall v. Eastin,s° the Kindler court rejected those terms
of the Oklahoma decree that were "intended directly to affect the
New York real property."" Since the Oklahoma court did have the
power to dissolve the marriage, however, the Kindler court held that
the Oklahoma divorce decree transformed the tenancy by the en-
tirety into a tenancy in common.82 Emphasizing that the alteration
11 Id., 400 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
73 Id. at 753, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
7' Id.
" Id. at 753-54, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 605. A tenancy by the entirety is an estate in land whose
existence depends upon the continuance of a marital relationship. See Stelz v. Shreck, 128
N.Y. 263, 28 N.E. 510 (1891). As long as the marriage continues, each spouse owns an
undivided one-half interest in the whole which cannot be severed by either cotenant unilater-
ally. See id. at 266-67, 28 N.E. at 511; Anello v. Anello, 22 App. Div. 2d 694, 253 N.Y.S.2d
759 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.). A tenancy by the entirety automatically becomes a tenancy in
common, however, upon a decree of divorce by a court of competent jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Yax v. Yax, 240 N.Y. 590, 148 N.E. 717 (1925) (mem.). A tenancy in common gives each
cotenant the right to partition the property, e.g., Wood v. Fleet, 36 N.Y. 499, 507 (1867), and
thereby to receive either an equitable share of the land itself or of the proceeds from its sale.
See RPAPL § 921(2) (McKinney 1972).
Is 60 App. Div. 2d at 754, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
70 Id.
215 U.S. 1 (1909).
" 60 App. Div. 2d at 754, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 606. The Kindler court had to recognize the
proper dissolution of the marriage by the Oklahoma court since that court had jurisdiction
over both parties. Id.; see Grigoleit v. Grigoleit, 205 Misc. 904, 133 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1954); Melchers v. Bertolido, 118 Misc. 196, 192 N.Y.S. 781 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1922); Ross & Crawford, Gresham's Law of Domestic Relations: The Alabama
Quickie, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 224, 228 (1961). A sister state's bilateral divorce decree estab-
lishing "vested rights" is a "final judgment" within the meaning of the Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Act, CPLR 5401-5408, and is entitled to full faith and credit. Wilder
v. Wilder, 93 Misc. 2d 247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978) (mem.).
81 60 App. Div. 2d at 754, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 606; see note 77 supra.
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in the character of ownership arose by operation of New York law8
rather than as a result of the relief provisions in the Oklahoma
decree, the Kindler court granted the defendant the right to an
equitable share of the property. 4
The result reached in Kindler was not mandated by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Fall v. Eastin. In Fall, the Court upheld
a Nebraska court's refusal to recognize a deed issued by a Washing-
ton court in an effort to convey title to Nebraska land pursuant to
a divorce decree.85 The Court reasoned that, while the Nebraska
court would be able to rely on the Washington court's prior determi-
nation of the underlying equities and transfer title, the failure to do
so did not violate the full faith and credit clause.8 Thus, Fall was
not a barrier to awarding the wife the relief requested in the Kindler
proceeding. In fact, the Fall Court, in dictum, expressly approved
the alternative course whereby a court voluntarily recognizes a sister
state court's relief order in a subsequent action to enforce the earlier
decree .
While older New York cases tend to support the Kindler posi-
tion,s the modern approach is to extend full faith and credit to real
" See note 77 supra.
81 60 App. Div. 2d at 754, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 606; see, e.g., Hosford v. Hosford, 273 App.
Div. 659, 80 N.Y.S.2d 306 (4th Dep't 1948); note 77 supra.
" In Fall v. Eastin, as part of a divorce decree, a Washington court ordered the husband
to convey to the wife his right, title, and interest in Nebraska land previously held by the
parties as tenants by the entirety. After the husband failed to convey title, the Washington
court executed a deed to the land to the wife. In the meantime, the husband issued a deed
to the defendant, Eastin, and mortgaged the land to W.H. Fall, who later released the
mortgage. The former wife subsequently brought an action in Nebraska against the tranferee.
215 U.S. at 2-4. The Supreme Court justified the Nebraska court's action, reasoning that the
Washington court, "not having jurisdiction of the res, cannot affect it by its decree, nor by a
deed made by a master in accordance with the decree." Id. at 11.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 11, 13-14. Indeed, in a subsequent case, Nebraska reversed its prior position. See
Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959). The Weesner court maintained
that, while a court of one state cannot directly affect title to another state's lands, it generally
does have the authority to compel by decree the defendant to execute and deliver up a deed
to property in the situs state. Id. at 356, 95 N.W.2d at 688-89. Since such an order originally
has been supported by in personam jurisdiction, it may be considered res judicata and given
force and effect under the full faith and credit clause provided all the necessary parties are
brought before the situs court. See note 71 supra.
u See Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819, 158 N.Y.S. 851 (1st Dep't 1916),
aff'd mem., 225 N.Y. 709, 122 N.E. 892, cert. dismissed, 251 U.S. 536 (1919); cf. Van Cor-
tlandt v. De Graffenried, 147 App. Div. 825, 132 N.Y.S. 1107 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd mem.,
204 N.Y. 667, 98 N.E. 1118 (1912) (Swiss court's order requiring husband to reconvey title to
New York property to ex-wife not enforced in New York court). In Tiedemann, a bilateral
Nevada divorce decree was held unenforceable insofar as it sought to compel the defendant
husband to account for community property situated in New York. While the Tiedemann
court recognized that the foreign decree was conclusive on the merits, it further stated that
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property awards resulting from suits in equity. 9 "One trial of an
the situs court was not bound to award equitable relief to enforce the property provisions of
the decree. But cf. Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 (1854) (injunction against suit recognized).
In Dobson, a judgment creditor of Pearce assigned the New York judgment to Dobson after
Pearce had obtained a Connecticut injunction enjoining any action brought upon the claim.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Dobson's subsequent suit:
It is not the particular relief which was granted which affects the parties litigating
in the courts of this state; but it is the adjudication and determination of the facts
by that court, the final decision that the judgment was procured by fraud, which
is operative here and necessarily prevents the plaintiff from asserting any claim
under it.
Id. at 166-67. Dobson is significant because the grant of an injunction against suit is usually
not recognized by other states. STUMBERG, supra note 67, at 123 n.52. Thus, the New York
position has remained somewhat uncertain. See generally 5 WK&M 5011.13. For an analysis
and rejection of the possible arguments for not treating the decree of relief as conclusive on
the situs state, see GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 411-13.
" See, e.g., GOODIuCH, supra note 67, at 410-14; Reese, supra note 67, at 190-91, 198-201.
One reason advanced for not requiring the situs state to enforce a foreign equitable decree is
that there is a need to protect against infringements on the situs state's sovereignty and
interests. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting); note
94 infra. Another argument stresses that equitable relief should be a discretionary tool of the
forum. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 102, Comment c (1971). Others
contend that continuing supervision or other burdens would be required if the situs state were
compelled to enforce foreign decrees. See id. Finally, the traditional approach states that the
situs forum should settle disputes involving land due to the local nature of the subject matter.
See STUMBERo, supra note 67, at 125.
It is submitted that none of these considerations should control in a case involving facts
similar to that presented by Kindler. Enforcing the order of the rendering court and thus
compelling the husband to convey land in the situs state to the wife does not infringe on the
situs state's jurisdiction or its legitimate interests. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 102, Comment d (1971). Since New York would recognize a deed executed by the
husband under threat of contempt of the Oklahoma court, see note 93 infra, it seems clear
that no further interests in relation to the land would be infringed simply because the hus-
band has evaded the foreign court's contempt machinery. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONFLCT OF LAWS § 102, Comment d (1971).
Nor should the nature of equitable relief be a bar to requiring the husband to convey
the land. Equitable relief is commonplace today, see note 91 infra, and the modem majority
view is to enforce the foreign decree. RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102,
Comment c (1971). Moreover, the language of both the full faith and credit clause and its
implementing statute is broad enough to include all equitable decrees within "judicial pro-
ceedings." See id.; note 91 infra.
Further, conveyance of title alone does not require continuing supervision, and therefore
enforcement of the foreign order would not unduly burden the situs court. As Professor Reese
points out, where the husband is ordered by the rendering court to convey land in the situs
state to the wife, the situs court is not undertaking the burden of ensuring the defendant's
compliance with the rendering court's decree; the situs court, which has jurisdiction over the
land, can enforce the decree simply by vesting the wife with title to the land. Reese, supra
note 67, at 190-91 & 191 n.43. Under these facts, the situs sfate's court merely is giving res
judicata effect to the equitable decision and remains free to eject the successful litigant from
the land if his possession subsequently contravenes its law or policy. Id. at 200.
Finally, the policy in favor of settling disputes to title to land locally is not undermined
by apportioning marital property in accordance with a foreign divorce decree. The divorce
court is not determining who has the better title to the land; instead, it seeks only to arrive
19781
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issue is enough"90 and extending full faith and credit to equitable
relief granted in bilateral divorce cases should prevent either party
from obtaining an unjust advantage." Some commentators would
go further and extend, with few exceptions, the mandate of full faith
and credit to all equity decrees.92
Apparently, the fourth department was disturbed by the man-
ner in which the relief had been requested or by the terms of the
decree itself. The pleadings seem to have relied entirely on the Okla-
homa decree which "purported directly to affect the title" to New
York land.93 The Kindler court's apparent distaste for the notion of
a sister state directly affecting title to New York land94 has its roots
at a fair settlement upon the dissolution of the marriage. See note 91 infra. If third parties
subsequently challenge title to the land, they are not bound by the determinations made by
a foreign proceeding in which they were not parties. See Reese, supra note 67, at 200. Only
if title disputes arise in the foreign divorce action might the policy in favor of settling title in
the situs state prevent recognition and enforcement of a foreign state's decree.
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939); see note 65 supra.
"It seems likely that the Oklahoma court which granted the Kindler divorce did not
award all the marital property to the wife but rather apportioned it between the parties after
balancing the competing interests of both spouses. The New York court therefore appears to
have bestowed a windfall on the husband, since he not only retained that which the Oklahoma
court determined was justifiably his, but also acquired one-half of what the Oklahoma court
determined to belong rightfully to his former wife.
,2 E.g., Reese, supra note 67, at 190-91; see GOODlUCH, supra note 67, at 410, 414. New
York has long accorded the same res judicata effect to equity decrees as it does to judgments
at law. E.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 402 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978); see
GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 411 (citing Post v. Neafie, 3 Cai. R. 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805));
STuMBERG, supra note 67, at 121-22 (citing Young v. Farwell, 165 N.Y. 341, 59 N.E. 143 (1901),
and Post v. Neafie, 3 Cai. R. 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)); 5 WK&M 1 5011.13. Professor Reese
would require the situs court to implement a foreign court's relief order except in two possible
circumstances. An exception would be made where the situs court is asked to enforce a decree
compelling the defendant to act, or enjoining the defendant from performing a given act,
where the sole means of enforcing the order is by threat of imprisonment. The other exception
suggested would occur when the form of relief granted by the foreign court would be unavaila-
ble in the situs state.
11 60 App. Div. 2d at 754, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 606; see Currie, supra note 71, at 672-76.
Professor Currie warns the attorney against two problems that may arise in representing a
spouse who seeks to have rights to extraterritorial real property determined in a divorce
action. The first danger is present when the attorney seeks to obtain a decree that is framed
"in terms which purport to affect the title directly . . . .Such terms . . . are an invitation
to the court at the situs. . . to invoke hornbook principles in support of a holding that the
foreign court had no jurisdiction to do what it did." Currie, supra note 71, at 672. The other
danger arises when the attorney claims relief at the situs "predicated on the assumption that
he has acquired legal title by virtue of the foreign decree." Id. at 673-74. Such prayers for
relief, according to Professor Currie, must be "scrupulously avoid[ed]." Id. at 673. Although
the proper theory had been invoked in Kindler, wherein the plaintiff sought an "action ...
seeking enforcement .. .of an Oklahoma divorce decree," 60 App. Div. 2d at 753, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 605, the Kindler court apparently "sh[ied] away from any position resting on
the contention that the foreign decree is a source of 'title' of any kind." Currie, supra note 7,
at 675.
" Oklahoma did have power to affect title to the New York realty indirectly. Had the
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in earlier territorial concepts of jurisdiction. 5 Such a provincial atti-
tude, however, has little viability as a principle of modern law. 6
Recognition of an in personam foreign decree that adjudicates the
rights of the parties in real property, wherever located, would not
appear to jeopardize the interests of the forum state and would
obviate the need for unnecessary relitigation. It is hoped that the
questionable policy of making judicial relief hinge solely on the
language of the complaint or the terms of the foreign court's decree
will be abandoned in future cases.
Frederick J. Dorchak
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
Right to counsel triggered by court-ordered lineup appearance may
be waived in attorney's absence
New York courts uniformly recognize that the filing of an accu-
satory instrument marks the commencement of formal adversary
proceedings" and thus the time at which a criminal defendant's
general right to counsel attaches. 8 Following the Court of Appeals'
husband executed a deed under threat of contempt, the conveyance would have passed title
to the wife, and New York would have been required to recognize that conveyance. See Fall
v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1909); Deschenes v. Tallman, 248 N.Y. 33, 37-38, 161 N.E. 321,
322 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.); GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 410, 412; notes 72 & 88 supra. Thus,
it seems the real objection is not that a foreign court may cause some ramifications within
the boundaries of a sister state by its judgment. Rather, the opposition appears to be founded
on due process grounds. Just as "[ain attempt to render a personal judgment where there is
no jurisdiction [over the person] is a violation of due process . . .[rendering the judgment]
void in the state where rendered and not entitled to recognition elsewhere," GOODmCH, supra
note 67, at 396 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)) (footnote omitted), so, too,
an exercise of power over land not within the rendering state is seen as "a 'forbidden infringe-
ment' of the interests of the situs state." Reese, supra note 67, at 200.
11 Courts resent infringements on their jurisdiction and, as a result, are quite often
solicitous of other states' sovereignty as well. See, e.g., Davis v. Tremain, 205 N.Y. 236, 98
N.E. 383 (1912); Ames v. Coirre, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County); Chesny v. Chesny, 197 Misc. 768, 94 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County),
modified on other grounds mem., 277 App. Div. 879, 98 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1950); 1
WK&M 301.02, at 3-10. In addition to maintaining respect for a sister state's sovereignty,
the local forum may be better able to settle disputes pertaining to realty. 7A WK&M
6301.26.
" Cf. STUMBERO, supra note 67, at 125 (there has been a "decided tendency in the
direction of giving full faith and credit to foreign decrees granted in connection with divorce"
in recent years).
11 E.g., People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 461, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173-74, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923,
929-30 (1974); People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881,
890 (1974); People v. Poywing, 90 Misc. 2d 197, 200, 393 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1977).
,1 See People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339-40, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881,
890-91 (1974). Initially, the Court of Appeals determined that the right to counsel attached
